Philip Fearnside (1998) raises the by now well-known issue of how to assess climate-change induced changes in human mortality. Others did so before (e.g.,
THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE be based on individual preferences. Estimates were derived from the preferences revealed by large groups of economic actors, for example when they buy safety equipment, or accept occupational hazard in return for a higher pay.
People's willingness to accept compensation for a higher risk is a function of their income. This is a fact of life, as are, unfortunately, large income differences. The values of a statistical life used by us and others reflect this reality. Thus, a risk to a poor person is valued less than the same risk to a rich person.
* One may find this objectionable, but what one actually objects to in this case is the underlying distribution of income. We, too, object to that. But we also think that fighting causes is better than fighting symptoms. Tinkering with revealed preferences will not improve the plight of the poor -in fact overestimating the value of statistical lives could even lead to an undesirable reallocation of funds away from poverty alleviation. There are better ways of redistributing income than via global warming.
